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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
NICK COONS, et al.,     ) 
            )    No. 2:10-cv-1714-GMS 
      Plaintiffs,  )  
 v.          )    Plaintiffs’ Response to    
            )  Defendants’ Motion to Stay Plaintiffs’ 
           )   Motion for Summary Judgment and   
           )  to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion  
TIMOTHY GEITHNER, et al.,  )  to Treat Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as one  
           )  for Summary Judgment 
           )   
      Defendants.  )  ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 On June 23, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay Plaintiffs‟ Motion for Summary 
Judgment in Part, as well as opposition to Plaintiffs‟ Motion to Treat Defendants‟ Motion to 
Dismiss as a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs‟ 12(d) Motion).  In support of 
their Motion, Defendants advance three main arguments:  First, they argue that in filing 
summary judgment before Defendants‟ Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss is resolved, Plaintiffs 
are asking this Court to exercise “hypothetical jurisdiction.”  (Defs.‟ Mem. Supp. Mot. Stay and 
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in Opp‟n to Plffs.‟ Rule 12(d) Mot. (Mem.) 4-6.)  Second, Defendants argue that that it would be 
a waste of resources to address a summary judgment motion at this time. (Mem. 4.) Third, 
Defendants claim if their (b)(1) Motion is denied, they “will wish to seek jurisdictional 
discovery” into Plaintiff Coons‟ financial resources because it is “impossible” for them to 
determine whether Coons will actually be subject to the minimum coverage provision when it 
takes effect in 2014.  (Id. at 6.)  In opposition to Plaintiffs‟ 12(d) Motion, Defendants argue that 
their citations to materials such as articles and statistics in support of their Motion to Dismiss 
does not warrant treating it as one for summary judgment.  (Id. at 7-8.)   
 Plaintiffs submit that proceeding with summary judgment on Plaintiffs‟ Second Amended 
Complaint (Plaintiffs‟ Complaint) will require no additional time or resources that are not 
already being expended on Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss.  To be sure, in a case like this that 
involves purely legal issues with limited exception, Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion is the 
functional equivalent of a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.  That explains why 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is essentially identical to the motions for summary judgment 
Defendants filed in the Florida and Virginia cases, (Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States, 2011 
WL 285683, at *24 (N.D. Fla. March 3, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 598, 610 (E.D. Va. 2010)).  Indeed, while Defendants argue that “requiring the parties 
and the Court to address plaintiffs‟ summary judgment motion at this time, including 
preparation of opposition papers and argument, would result in waste of time,” (Mem. 4), they 
failed to identify a single issue they would be required to address on summary judgment that 
they have not already addressed in their Motion to Dismiss.   
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 Defendants did not have to file a combined 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) Motion to Dismiss in this 
case; instead, they could have chosen to file only a 12(b)(1) Motion seeking dismissal solely on 
jurisdictional grounds, as they did for example in Bellow v. HHS, No. 1:10-cv-00165 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 15, 2011).  If they had proceeded in this manner, they would have eliminated 
approximately 35 pages of briefing of the 12(b)(6) issues that, according to Defendants‟ own 
argument, would not be necessary to address even if the Court were to dismiss this case on 
jurisdictional grounds.  Since Defendants do not dispute that their Motion to Dismiss is 
essentially identical to their motions for summary judgment in the Virginia and Florida cases, it 
is baffling that Defendants would persist in opposing moving forward with summary judgment 
proceedings.  In fact, the only matter ostensibly standing in the way of proceeding with 
summary judgment is Defendants‟ contention that should this Court deny their Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion, they will need to conduct “jurisdictional discovery” to confirm Plaintiff Coons is indeed 
subject to the Individual Mandate.  (Mem. 6.)  However, even if such “discovery” were 
warranted, it would require no significant expenditure of time, and thus would not warrant 
staying summary judgment proceedings.   Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that 
Defendants‟ Motion for Stay be denied and Plaintiffs‟ Rule 12(d) Motion be granted.   
 I.  Common Sense, Not Hypothetical Jurisdiction, Is at Issue 
 
 Defendants apparently would like this Court to believe that the only issue before the 
Court is Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  (See Mem. 1.)  Defendants 
maintain that if their motion is granted in full, this case will never reach the merits; therefore, it 
is in the interest of judicial economy to stay summary judgment consideration.  (Id. at 1-2.)  But 
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that might arguably have been convincing only if Defendants had not proceeded with their 
broad-based Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which requires the parties to conduct briefing of summary 
judgment scope.  This is why it is disingenuous at best for Defendants to cast Plaintiffs‟ 
summary judgment and 12(d) motions as ones that ask this Court to rule on the merits of 
Plaintiffs‟ Complaint before resolving the jurisdictional issues.  Indeed, Plaintiffs‟ motions do 
not ask the Court to do this anymore than Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss asks the Court to do.  
 Defendants cite a series of cases that address different jurisdictional issues, though none 
are relevant or analogous to this case.  For example, Defendants cite to Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. 
F.T.C., 625 F.Supp. 747, 750-751 (D.D.C. 1986), where the court stayed the case because 
administrative remedies had not been exhausted.  Defendants also cite to Steel Co. v. Citizens for 
a Better Environment, where the Court rejected the doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” under 
which “several Courts of Appeals  . . . found it proper to proceed immediately to the merits 
question, despite jurisdictional objections.”  523 U.S. 83, 1011-1016 (1998).  To be clear, 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question the courts 
must answer before passing judgment on the claims in a case.  Id. at 1016.    
   Defendants also rely on another non-analogous case, Ex Parte McArdle, 74 U.S. 506 
(1868), which held that when Congress repeals the Court‟s jurisdiction over the hearing of 
certain appeals, including jurisdiction over a case that was currently before the Court, the Court 
was “[w]ithout jurisdiction” and could not “proceed.”  Id. at 514.   Likewise, Public Citizen v. 
Bomer, 274 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2002), involved a plaintiff who tried to use summary judgment 
“evidence” to defeat a motion to dismiss, while in Hamrick v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 
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No. 03-4202, 2004 WL 723649, *1 (D. Kansas March 11, 2004) (an unpublished case), the 
district court ruled that in that particular case, under those particular circumstances, it was in the 
interest of “judicial economy” to defer briefing on summary judgment.   
 Defendants also point to the proceedings in other cases challenging the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),
1
 where summary judgment proceedings were stayed 
pending jurisdictional rulings.  However, in hindsight, the stays in those cases did little in terms 
of conserving judicial economy.  That is because the scope of Defendants‟ motions to dismiss in 
cases like Virginia, Florida and Mead v. Holder, No. 10-00950 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2010), required 
the same investment of time and resources of the parties and the court as would have been 
required on a motion for summary judgment.  
 Defendants argue that “even in Virginia and Florida, upon which plaintiffs‟ rely upon 
heavily, summary judgment motions were filed only after those courts had ruled on motions to 
dismiss.”  (Mem. 6.)  However, we now know that in those two cases, which were the first filed 
challenging PPACA, Defendants‟ motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment were 
essentially identical.  Indeed, the Florida plaintiffs foresaw that very outcome and proposed at 
their Rule 16 conference combined briefing of the (b)(1) and Rule 56 issues, due to the 
“overlapping arguments between what [the Government was] . . . arguing as a matter of law for 
dismissal, and what [the plaintiffs were] . . .  arguing as a matter of law for a judgment in [their] 
favor as a matter of Summary Judgment under Rule 56.”  Florida, 3:10-cv-00091-RV, *12 (Doc. 
                            
1
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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44) (May 26, 2010) (excerpts from Transcript attached as Exh. 1).   In that case, like here, 
Defendants had filed a “very broad-based Motion to Dismiss, not just on issues of justiciability 
or ripeness or standing [as was the case in Bellow v. HHS
2
]. . . but also on the basis of whether 
[their] causes of action state legal claims for which relief can be granted.”  Id. at 25.  Ultimately, 
the Florida Court ordered sequential briefing; however, in setting the schedule in this manner, 
the Court recognized that there was not a “good, full grasp of how the issues [were] going to 
mesh” in terms of overlap.  Id. at 28.  We are now well-aware of how the issues relating to 
Defendants‟ 12(b)(6) Motion and those to be raised on summary judgment “mesh” and 
“overlap.”3  Accordingly, there is no purpose served by engaging in multiple and sequential 
briefing in this case.  
 II. The Purported Need for Jurisdictional Discovery Does Not Support a Stay 
 Thus, the sole issue ostensibly in the way of proceeding with summary judgment is 
Defendants‟ claim that should the Court deny their 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, they will “wish 
to take jurisdictional discovery” relating to whether “Coons will actually be subject to the 
minimum coverage provision when it takes effect in 2014.”  (Mem. 6.)  Defendants claim they 
                            
2
Defendants cite Bellow for their proposition that courts must determine jurisdiction before they 
can rule on the merits of those claims.  (Mem. 5.)  However, Bellow is distinguishable because 
at the time plaintiff Bellow filed a motion for summary judgment, Defendants had only filed a 
12(b)(1) motion, and thus had not put the entire case before the Court as a matter of law through 
a 12(b)(6) Motion.   
3
Defendants rely on Mead, No. 10-00950, EFC 20, for the proposition that “it would be a waste 
of everyone‟s time and resources to have concurrent briefing on both Motions.” (Mem. 6.) 
However, Plaintiffs here are seeking one set of briefings, not “concurrent briefing.”  
Furthermore, the Mead stay did not in reality stay anything because there, as here, Defendants 
filed a broad based 12(b)(6) motion.  See Exh. 2, Mead Table of Contents and Introduction. 
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will need facts such as “the nature of Coons‟ current employment, a description of his „financial 
resources,‟ and his income and expenses.”  Id.   However, the plaintiffs‟ declarations submitted 
in the Florida case were substantially similar to Mr. Coons‟ declaration, yet there is no 
indication that Defendants sought any such “jurisdictional” discovery in that case.  See 
Declarations submitted in the Florida, Group Exh. 3.    
 Upon reviewing Defendants‟ Motion for Stay, Plaintiffs contacted Defendants to inquire 
about and attempt to address the discovery issue.  Unfortunately, Plaintiffs‟ efforts to address 
this issue were to no avail, with Defendants declaring that they are “under no obligation” to 
discuss this matter.   (See Correspondence, Exh. 4.)  Accordingly, it is unclear what discovery 
Defendants claim they will need.  For example, will they seek discovery that proves whether Mr. 
Coons is a member of an Indian tribe, whether he is a veteran, incarcerated, or eligible for 
Medicare or Medicaid?   Would production of tax documents and a driver‟s license for 
Defendants‟ inspection satisfy Defendants‟ question as to whether Coons is subject to the 
Mandate?  In any event, this is not the type of issue that should require formal discovery or 
create any disputed fact.  Indeed, Plaintiff Coons is prepared to produce his tax documents for 
inspection by Defendants (to show he is subject to the Mandate), and a copy of his driver‟s 
license for Defendants‟ inspection (that shows his year of birth).  While these are not documents 
any plaintiff would wish to file in the public docket, certainly Defendants‟ review of them 
should be sufficient to confirm any reasonably calculated jurisdictional questions they may 
have.  Certainly, this is an issue that can be addressed swiftly, if Defendants are willing to work 
cooperatively.   
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 III. Plaintiffs’ Rule 12(d) Motion Should be Granted 
 
 
 In opposing Plaintiffs‟ 12(d) Motion, Defendants cite a string of cases that discuss what a 
court may take into consideration when reviewing a Motion to Dismiss, without ever addressing 
the fact that their Motion to Dismiss is identical to their motions for summary judgment in the 
Florida and Virginia cases.  (See Mem. 7-8.)  Indeed, Plaintiffs do not dispute that matters 
attached to complaints or referenced therein, as well as public records of which a court can take 
judicial notice, id. at 8, can be considered in reviewing a motion to dismiss.  However, the 
materials Defendants relied on in their Motion to Dismiss, which Plaintiffs refer to in their Rule 
12(d) Motion, are neither materials that are attached to or cited in Plaintiffs‟ Complaint, nor are 
they materials of which the Court can take judicial notice.   
 Accordingly, while Defendants expended a great deal of space string-citing numerous 
cases that discuss judicial notice, they are of no consequence here.  For example, in Coit v. 
Biltmore Bank, No. 2010 WL 20365663, *1 (D. Ariz, May 19, 2010), this Court held that it may 
take judicial notice of matters of public records from the Maricopa County Recorder‟s office.  In 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F,3d 1305, 1312 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit held 
that a court may take judicial notice of legislative history.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007), held that when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Courts 
“ordinarily examine . . . documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of 
which a court may take judicial notice.”  Id.   Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 
992, 998-999 (9th Cir. 2010), held that a “prospectus” referred to in the complaint, as well as 
information displayed on government websites, could be taken into consideration.  Likewise, in 
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Lazy Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008), the court noted that documents 
referenced in the complaint may be considered; while in Kanelos v. County of Mohave,  2011 
WL 587203, *2  (Snow, J.) (D. Ariz, February 9, 2011), this Court held it may consider 
documents attached to the complaint or that are referenced extensively therein and accepted by 
all parties as authentic.   
 Thus, Defendants miss the point by focusing on the legislative history and other public 
records they relied on in their motion to dismiss, which Plaintiffs did not cite to in support of 
their 12(d) Motion.  Instead, the documents at issue are those listed in Defendants‟ Table of 
Contents to Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss (pp. xii and xiii), which are numerous publications 
and surveys containing argument, opinion and purported statistics.  Nonetheless, the basis for 
treating Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment has less to do with the 
fact that Defendants cited numerous documents in their Motion that are neither attached to nor 
referenced in the Complaint, nor are public records of which the Court can take judicial notice, 
and more to do with the fact that Defendants‟ 12(b)(6) Motion is for all intents and purposes the 
functional equivalent of a motion for summary judgment.   
 CONCLUSION 
 Defendants fail to present a single good reason this case should not proceed to summary 
judgment if Plaintiffs‟ standing is upheld.  And it is entirely unclear as to why they would wish 
to stay summary judgment and engage in redundant briefing.
4
  For the foregoing reasons, 
                            
4Defendants appear to chide Plaintiffs for amending their Complaint on two occasions and for 
withdrawing their injunction motion.  (See Mem. 1-2.)  Those steps were taken to promote 
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Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants‟ Motion for Stay of Plaintiffs‟ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and grant Plaintiffs‟ Motion to Treat Defendants‟ Rule 12(b)(6) 
Motion as a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment in Part.  
July 7, 2011       
 
         RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,        
 
         s/Diane Cohen  
        Clint Bolick (Arizona Bar No. 021684) 
        Diane S. Cohen (Arizona Bar No. 027791) 
        Christina M. Kohn (Arizona Bar No. 027983) 
         GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 
        500 E. Coronado Rd.   
        Phoenix, AZ 85004 
        P: (602) 462-5000  
        Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
                                                                                              
expeditious consideration of this case and in response to Defendants‟ actions implementing 
PPACA.  Because PPACA‟s Medicaid mandates on Arizona were set to cripple the state‟s 
budget, Arizona requested and was granted “permission” from the federal government to 
discontinue coverage for a particular Medicaid population, something the state could not have 
otherwise done without jeopardizing all Medicaid matching funds.  As a result, the claims of the 
twenty-nine state legislator-plaintiffs are not ripe, requiring their withdrawal and an amendment 
of the Complaint.  The injunction motion was withdrawn based on Defendants‟ interpretation of 
certain provisions pertaining to the Independent Payment Advisory Board, which was set forth 
in a stipulation and entered by this Court.  Most certainly, neither the withdrawal of the motion 
for preliminary injunction nor ensuing amendments to the Complaint are grounds for needlessly 
delaying summary judgment consideration.  In any event, it is in both parties‟ interests to pursue 
the most expedient course for this litigation.   
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I, Diane Cohen, an attorney, hereby certify that on July 7, 2011, I electronically filed 
Plaintiffs‟ Response to Defendants Motion for Stay and Response to Defendants‟ Opposition to 
Plaintiffs‟ Motion to Treat Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss as one for Summary Judgment, with 
the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court, District of Arizona by using the 
CM/ECF system. 
 I further certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that 
service will be accomplished by the District Court‟s CM/ECF system. 
 
       s/ Diane S. Cohen  
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